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The Persian Gulf War Oil Spill: Reassessing the Law of
Environmental Protection and the Law of Armed Conflict
Christopher C. Joyner* and James T. Kirkhope**
I. INTRODUCTION
i n recent years there has developed within the law of nations a special
corpus of legal norms aimed at protecting the earth's environment.
The philosophy undergirding this international environmental law seeks
to promote a protection ethic to confront situations that put the integrity
of the environment at risk. International environmental law has thus
become primarily preclusive in nature. It aims to establish norms that
prevent and dissuade harmful injury to the environment, rather than
those that might restore or react to injuries already done.1
Perhaps the most destructive among man's many activities that
threaten the environment is that of war. Indeed, it remains axiomatic
that warfare is detrimental to the environment.2 The international com-
munity has responded to this challenge by establishing special responsi-
bilities and obligations for governments within the existing international
law of armed conflict. The modern law of armed conflict sets forth
norms and expectations expressly designed to restrict the ways and
means of destruction during war by mandating that belligerents consider
what environmental impacts their actions will have.' The regulatory
crossroads between the law of environmental protection and the law of
armed conflict became joined during the 1991 Persian Gulf War waged
by the United Nations allied coalition against Iraq.
On January 16, 1991, U.N. coalition air forces attacked Iraqi mili-
* Professor of Political Science and Member of the Elliott School of International Affairs, The
George Washington University.
** Research Coordinator, Terrorism and Law-Intensity Conflict Program, U.S. Global Strat-
egy Council.
I See generally Oscar Schachter, The Emergence of International Environmental Law, 44 J.
INT'L AFr. 457 (1991).
2 See generally STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTrrrTE (SIPRI), Eco-
LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR (1976); SIPRI, ENVIRONMENTAL
WARFARE: A TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY APPRAISAL (Arthur H. Westing ed. 1984); SIPRI,
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1977).
3 See generally FRiTs KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR (1987).
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tary targets in Kuwait and Iraq. The attack came more than six months
after Iraq's conquest and occupation of Kuwait and Suddam Hussein's
persistent refusal to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait after repeated in-
ternational efforts to negotiate a peaceful end to the situation.5 On Janu-
ary 26, press reports indicated that Iraq had taken retaliatory action by
deliberately pumping huge amounts of crude oil from Kuwait's Sea Is-
land Oil Terminal into the Persian Gulf, beginning perhaps as early as
January 23.6 The oil that gushed forth from the supertanker facility
eventually produced a forty mile oil slick along the southern Kuwaiti and
northern Saudi coastline.7 Initial estimates placed the total volume of
petroleum discharged between fifteen and seventeen million gallons,
amounting to the largest spill ever in the Persian Gulf.' Later estimates
confirmed and even elevated the magnitude of the disaster. By late Janu-
ary, the volume of oil contaminating the Gulf had reached some 460
million gallons, the largest oil spill in history.9 Experts predicted the
disaster would be twelve times greater than the Exxon Valdez oil spill
that had occurred in March 1989 off Prince William Sound, Alaska.' °
Suspicion about Iraq's motivations for its deliberate release of oil
into the Persian Gulf centered on the slick's potential impact of hinder-
ing an amphibious assault by allied forces along the Kuwaiti coast.'I
Another motivation may have been the incapacitating effects such oil
contamination could wreak on Saudi Arabia's desalinization plants, a cir-
cumstance that would have severely deprived allied forces of necessary
water supplies.' 2 In the end, however, the slick produced neither of
those results. What it did produce was unprecedented environmental
4 Andrew Rosenthal, US. and Allies Open Air War on Iraq; Bomb Baghdad and Kuwaiti
Targets; "No Choice" But Force, Bush Declares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1991, at Al.
5 See generally Christopher C. Joyner, Sanctions, Compliance and International Law: Reflec-
tions on the United Nations' Experience Against Iraq, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1991).
6 See R.W. Apple, Jr., US. Says Iraq Pumps Kuwaiti Oil into Guy,' Vast Damage is Feared
from Growing Slick, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1991, at Al; Robert D. McFadden, Oil Threatens Fishing
and Water Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1991, at Al. Oil was reported to be spewing from the Sea
Island Terminal off the coast of Kuwait, approximately one-half of which was coming from storage
facilities, with the remainder being pumped through undersea pipes from 5 tankers berthed at the
occupied Kuwaiti port of Mina al Ahmadi. Rick Atkinson & Dan Balz, Iraq Dumping Flood of Oil
Into Gulf US. Says, WASH. PosT, Jan. 26, 1991, at Al.
7 R.W. Apple Jr., Oil Spill, Growing Rapidly, Heads for Vital Saudi Sites; Air War Goals Said to
Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1991, at Al.
8 Keith Schneider, Saudis Seek U.S. Help with Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1991, at A12.
9 R.W. Apple, Jr., War in the Gulf. The Overview; 80 of Iraq's Planes Now in Iran; Hosts Intent
Called a Puzzle; U.S. Says Flow of Oil is Stemmed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1991, at Al.
10 The Exxon Valdez lost 11 million gallons of crude oil when it went aground on March 24,
1989. See Worst U.S. Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1991, at A4.
II Apple, supra note 7. See also Philip Shenon, Huge Slick Still a Threat to Saudi Water
Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1991, at Al.
12 Apple, supra note 7. The spill threatened to close Saudi Arabia's largest desalting plant at
Jubail, which produces one-half the potable water for Saudi Arabia. See Schneider, supra note 8;
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devastation throughout the Persian Gulf. The shrimp industry in the
Gulf was practically wiped out, fish and other marine life were ravaged,
and the Gulf's rich coral reef was put on the brink of extinction.' 3
Highlighted by recent concern over grave global implications of con-
temporary environmental abuse, Iraq's resort to oil pollution as a
weapon of environmental destruction raises important legal questions
that need to be addressed. Accordingly, this study focuses on the inter-
national legal ramifications of a government's intentional discharge of
petroleum into a local marine environment during wartime.14 Both envi-
ronmental protection law and the law of armed conflict are examined,
with a special view toward assessing their regulatory interface. The
problems of determining lawful intent and policy rationale are then
treated. From this analysis, it is hoped that a greater appreciation will
emerge of the positive dynamics between environmental law and the laws
of war, not only for the case of Iraq during the 1991 Persian Gulf War,
but also for the regulation of armed conflict in general.
II. SETTING THE GULF STAGE
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and conquered its neighbor, Ku-
R.W. Apple, Jr., Relentless Tide of Oil Fouls Shores of Empty Saudi City, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1991,
at Al.
13 Philip Shenon, Oil Company Ecologist Fears Slick Will Leave a "Dead Gulf," N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 1991, at A7. Sea turtles, shrimp, dolphins, and marine birds were feared grievously affected.
Id. See also Michael Isikoff, Saudis Brace for Onslaught of Oil Slick, WASH. POsT., Jan. 27, 1991, at
A22; Barbara Rosewicz, Upping the Ante: Gulf Oil Spill Shows Iraq's Resolve to Wage War on Its
Own Terms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1991, at Al & A4. For an insider's perspective of the cleanup
operation organized by Saudi Aramco and its Oil Spill Committee, see Tom Pledge, War Within a
War: Fighting the Gulf Oil Spill, ARAMCO WORLD, May-June 1991, at 35. For treatment of the
impacts of ocean pollution, see generally K. A. GouRLAY, PoisoNERs OF THE SEAS (1988).
14 It should not be overlooked that Iraqi forces also torched 752 oil wells as they were fleeing
Kuwait. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Kuwaitis Battling Huge Pools of Oil, N.Y. "TMEs, Apr. 21, 1992, at
Al. Nearly 100 more wells shooting geysers of oil failed to ignite. The environmental damage has
been quantified in a variety of ways. The burning wells released up to 500,000 tons of air pollution a
week with levels of airborne particles climbing up to 400 times U.S. EPA standards. The smoke
from the fires reached a ceiling of about 12,000 feet above sea level and the pollutants formed a dark
haze seen 300 miles away. See generally Michael Weiskopf, Oil Fire Pollution Assessed, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 4, 1991, at A25; Lee Hockstader, Toxic Gas Deepens Kuwait's Crisis, WASH. POST, Mar.
23, 1991, at Al. The economic devastation was assessed as a loss of 6 million barrels a day, approxi-
mating a daily revenue loss of $100-4120 million. Extinguishing the fires was initially projected to
take as long as five years, at an estimated cost of $430 million. That cost did not include the repair of
80 percent of the 1080 wells damaged by Iraq's occupation. See Hockstader, supra, at A16; William
Booth, Kuwait Seeks More Help in Combatting "Well Fires," WASH. PoST, Apr. 14, 1991, at A18.
By November 1991, the last of these oil well fires had been extinguished. Ibrahim, supra. Restora-
tion of Kuwait's oil industry to its pre-invasion condition could cost $10 billion, although a new
environmental hazard in the form of huge oil lakes forming in the desert could increase the final bill
considerably. Id.
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wait. 5 This military action culminated a longstanding series of disputes
between the two states, including contests concerning territorial claims,
oil drilling practices, and economic competition over oil pricing prac-
tices. 6 Yet the escalation to overt military aggression was not out of
character for the government of Saddam Hussein. It is important to re-
call that a decade earlier, in September 1980, Iraq had invaded another
neighbor, Iran, as the latter was recovering from the upheavals of a do-
mestic revolution. 7 The international community, after weighing the re-
spective dangers of supporting an aggressor authoritarian state (Iraq) or
a fundamentalist Shiite Islamic state (Iran), leaned in large part toward
neutrality. Yet, as one commentator observed, "The Iraqi decision to go
to war with Iran, backed by a solid Arab entente, . . . [was aimed at]
crippling Iran militarily and eliminating its political dominance of the
region once and for all."'" The international community failed to rebuke
Iraq sternly in 1980 for its aggression. In fact, several governments actu-
ally opted to support the Iraqi government-politically, militarily, and
emotionally. '9
Iraq's precedent for invading its neighbors was established, and ar-
guably, tacit acceptance of that action was given by the international
community. Yet waging a war of aggression was not the only interna-
tional norm breached by Iraq during its nearly eight years of fighting
with Iran. In 1984 and 1985, facing overwhelming numbers of enemy
troops on the battlefield, Iraq resorted to using chemical weapons against
Iranian forces,20 acts clearly in contravention of its obligation under the
15 Michael R. Gordon, Iraq Army Invades Capital of Kuwait in Fierce Fighting, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 1990, at Al; R.W. Apple, Jr., Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and Its Oil; U.S. Condemns
Attack, Urges United Action, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1991, at Al.
16 Clyde H. Farnsworth, Bush, In Freezing Assets, Bans $30 Billion to Hussein, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 1990, at A9; Iraqi Invasion, Step by Step, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1990, at A9. Hussein was
plagued by a worsening economic crisis following the cease-fire of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Peace
brought a reduction of Persian Gulf state subsidies, international credits, and elevated oil production
rates keeping prices low for Iraqi exports. By May 1990, Iraq demanded of Kuwait and other states
cancellation of its Iran-Iraq war debts, additional economic aid, increased OPEC oil prices, control
of two Kuwaiti islands, and reparations for oil taken by Kuwait from the disputed Rumailah oil
field. For analysis of these issues, see William B. Quandt, The Middle East in 1990, FOREIGN AFF.,
America and the World 1990/1991, at 49, 51-53.
17 Werner Wiskari, Iraq Said to Gain Its Border Aims In Iran Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
1980, at Al.
18 Claudia Wright, Implications of the Iraq War, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 274, 291 (Winter
1980/1981).
19 As an irony of history, Iraq received political and financial support during its war with Iran
from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and even United States policy tilted towards a pro-Saddam Hussein
attitude in re-flagging 11 Kuwaiti tankers. For a multidimensional assessment of the Iran-Iraq War
see generally THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: LESSONS FOR STRATEGY, LAW AND DIPLOMACY (Christo-
pher C. Joyner ed., 1990).
20 Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Says Iraqis Use Poison Gas; Shultz and Baghdad Official Meet,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1985, at I1; U.S. Makes Direct Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1985, at A8.
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1925 Geneva Protocol.21 Once the threshold of violating the Geneva
Protocol had been surpassed, two chilling consequences occurred. First,
the decision and discretion to use chemical weapons on the battlefield
was passed by the Iraqi government to field commanders. Second, the
use of chemical weapons beyond the traditional inter-state conflict be-
came more practical as Iraq waged chemical warfare against its own de-
fenseless Kurdish citizens in 1988.22
Iraq also resorted to a campaign of economic dislocation. During
the war against Iran, Iraqi forces launched SCUD missiles to strike oil
pipelines, storage facilities, refineries, terminals, tankers, wells and off-
shore platforms. 23 It should not have been wholly unexpected, therefore,
that similar tactics might be invoked by Iraq against forces of the allied
coalition, especially at targets located in the Persian Gulf states.
Premeditated sabotage of a supertanker terminal to introduce mil-
lions of gallons of oil into the Persian Gulf's marine environment grossly
violated the spirit and the letter of both the law of environmental protec-
tion and the law of armed conflict. Indeed, the heinous nature of Iraq's
massive pollution of the Gulf's marine ecosystem provoked widespread
condemnation. One commentator exclaimed that "Hussein has shown
himself capable of holding the environment as his hostage."'24 President
Bush branded the policy "a deliberate act of environmental terrorism
that will hurt the entire world. ' 25 Such rhetoric prompted coining such
legally nebulous terms as "ecoterrorism" and "ecocide" to describe
Iraq's act of intentionally polluting the Gulf by oil.
Iraq's deliberate release of massive amounts of oil into the Persian
Gulf poses a fundamental question for international law. Does such a
tactic of massive marine pollution during wartime breach environmental
protection law, or some aspect of the law of armed conflict, or both? Put
another way, what real relevance does "the worst environmental disaster
in the history of the Persian Gulf region ' 26 hold for emerging interna-
tional law?
21 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
22 Elaine Sciolino, Kurdish Chief Gains Support in U.S. Visit, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1988, at 13;
More Chemical Attacks Reported, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1988, at 115; June Johnson, U.S. Asserts
Iraq Used Poison Gas Against the Kurds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1988, at Al.
23 See generally Phebe Marr, The Iran-Iraq War: The View from Iraq, in THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR, supra note 19, at 59. Cf. Eric Hooglund, Strategic and Political Objectives in the Gulf War:
Iran's View, in id. at 39.
24 Thomas W. Lippman & William Booth, Oil Spreading Off Kuwait Poses Ecological Disaster,
WASH. Posr, Jan. 26, 1991, at A13.
25 Barton Gellman, Theories Vary on Motives for Spill, WASH. Posr, Jan. 26, 1991, at A13.
26 Dan Balz, GulfOil Slick Spreads Rapidly, WASH. PoST, Jan. 27, 1991, at Al.
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III. EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
In his 1949 essay "The Land Ethic," Aldo Leopold observed that
there is a need for every citizen to realize that the earth is not here for
humans to manipulate, but that we exist as part of an interrelated world.
As he put it, a "land ethic" "reflects the existence of an ecological con-
science and this in turn reflects a conviction of individual responsibility
for the health of the land. Health is the capacity of the land for self-
renewal. Conservation is our effort to understand and preserve this
capacity."27 Belief in this credo supplies the impetus for an ecological
ethic that furnishes the very foundation for global environmentalism. No
less important, it also represents an ecological ideal toward which hu-
mankind is urged to aspire.
Humans are viewed within this modern ecological ethic as an inte-
gral, interactive part of the whole global environment. While mainte-
nance of a pristine environment would be ideal, that condition is not
realistic. Some degradation is inevitable. But the point is that man's ac-
tivities should be directed so as to minimize harm done to the
environment.
The global ecological perspective, with its emphasis on respect for
environmental integrity, has come about only recently. The United Na-
tions in 1972 produced a set of normative guidelines for states that em-
body fundamental principles of environmental preservation and
conservation. These guidelines were set out in the Declaration of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (the Stockholm
Declaration), articulated on June 16, 1972.28 As proclaimed in the Dec-
laration's second principle, "natural resources of the earth, including the
air, water, land, flora, fauna and especially representative samples of nat-
ural ecosystems, must be safeguarded."29 There is little doubt that, with
respect to the Persian Gulf, this duty to safeguard those natural re-
sources and ecosystems applied to all states.30
The Stockholm Declaration established other general principles that
have become more technical as the international community has mobil-
ized to address ever pressing concerns, such as toxic pollutants and
dumping. These additional responsibilities are aimed at banning dis-
charge practices that might inject serious or irreversible damage upon the
local ecosystem. Especially prohibited in this regard is discharge of toxic
27 ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND CouNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 221
(1949).
28 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF .48/14 and Corr.1 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter
Stockholm Declaration].
29 Id. principle 2.
30 See Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 423 (1973) (discussing the applicability of the Stockholm Declaration).
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substances and release of heat in such quantities or concentrations that
might damage the environment."
The Stockholm Declaration also emphasizes prevention of pollution.
States are required to take "all possible steps" to preclude pollution of
the seas by any substances that might be hazardous to human health, or
harm living marine resources, or damage amenities, or interfere "with
other legitimate uses of the sea."32 The unprecedented magnitude of the
Gulf oil spill strongly suggests this international ecological norm was se-
verely breached.
The keystone of the Stockholm Declaration's mandate against trans-
national pollution is found in its Principle 21. This provision at first
blush might seem to release a state from environmental protection re-
sponsibilities under the cloak of national sovereignty as it provides that
states have the "sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant
to their own environmental policies."33 Even so, Principle 21 goes on to
posit that states have "the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."34 This
fiat confirms the duty that states are bound not to create environmental
conditions or pollution circumstances that might injure the territory or
property of other states.35
To facilitate international cooperation, the concept of liability-
compensation for wrongs done and damages committed whether inten-
tional or not-has a long tradition in international law.36 This concept
of compensation finds expression in Principle 22 of the Stockholm Decla-
ration which indicates that "States shall cooperate to develop further the
international law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of
pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within
the jurisdiction or control of such states to areas beyond their jurisdic-
31 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 28, principle 6.
32 Id. principle 7. Importantly, this phrase is repeated nearly verbatim in subsequent instru-
ments intended to prevent marine pollution. See infra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
33 Id. principle 21.
34 Id.
35 Importantly, this duty and the international legal principle of transfrontier protection had
been recognized and articulated in a number of earlier decisions by international tribunals. See, e.g.,
Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Canada), Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941); Corfu
Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (April 9); Lake Lanoux Case (Fr. v. Spain), 62 REVUE
GlNPRALE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 79-119 (1958), reprinted in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156
(1959).
36 See generally L.F.E. Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of Inter-
national Law, 14 INI'L & COMp. L.Q. 1189 (1965); Sanford E. Gaines, International Principles for
Transnational Environmental Liability: Can Developments in Municipal Law Help Break the Im-
passe?, 30 HARv. INT'L L.J. 311 (1989).
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tion." s Interestingly, the wording "activities within the jurisdiction or
control" eliminates the potential dilemma (and subsequent loophole) of
determining the precise legal status of the territory from which the causal
activities occurred. A state would be responsible for damages, irrespec-
tive of whether its government possessed legal jurisdiction over another
territory (as Iraq claimed over Kuwait at the time), or was merely a bel-
ligerent occupation force, or had been evicted from the area.
It might be noted that the Stockholm Declaration offers a possible
caveat by which some state might seek to evade responsibility for its ac-
tions. In full, Principle 23 provides that:
Without prejudice to such criteria as may be agreed upon by the inter-
national community, or to standards which will have to be determined
nationally, it will be essential in all cases to consider the systems of
values prevailing in each country, and the extent of the applicability of
standards which are valid for the most advanced countries, but which
may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for the develop-
ing country.'8
In this context, a government might argue that its resort to wide-
spread pollution as a weapon reflected either national, ethnic, or religious
norms, or represented a "poor-man's" weapon of mass destruction.
However, any of these contentions would be difficult to substantiate con-
vincingly. In addition, one can not help but wonder how to square the
notion that destruction of the very resources necessary for development
could be deemed necessary to preserve a state's cultural integrity and
ensure its physical survival.39
The normative pillars of the Stockholm Declaration were built upon
a foundation of prior international conventions and regional agree-
ments.' Even so, in support of the normative considerations that flowed
37 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 28, principle 22.
38 Id. principle 23.
39 In the case of Iraq and the Gulf spill, contemporary normative views of the Islamic world
were clearly expressed as most Arab governments overtly condemned Iraq's aggression against Ku-
wait, a fact evidenced by the prominent cooperation of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the
United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Qatar in the allied coalition against Iraq. Likewise, it would be
profoundly difficult for the Iraqi leadership to charge cultural bias against its national character by a
hostile (i.e., pro-Western) value system. A more plausible explanation for Saddam Hussein's actions
suggests that Iraq may have been deprived of the economic value of Kuwait's oil by the United
Nations' embargo, and thus had few inhibitions about testing the utility of that oil as a weapon.
40 One of the earliest modern agreements to deal with environmental protection was the 1959
Antarctic Treaty. This agreement prohibits nuclear explosions, the disposal of radioactive wastes,
and military fortification and maneuvers on the continent. The treaty also designated the area south
of 60* South Latitude as a region for scientific research, to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
Second, the 1963 Test Ban Treaty strongly asserted an ethic of environmental protection, in
banning all nuclear weapons tests in outer space, the earth's atmosphere and beneath the oceans.
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from the Stockholm Declaration, the international community has since
devised an extensive body of legal instruments for protecting the earth's
environment. 1 Especially pertinent in this regard are those international
instruments intended to safeguard against marine pollution.42
Over the past four decades, several agreements dealing with pollu-
tion from vessels have been promulgated, largely under the auspices of
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (formerly the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization). 3 These interna-
tional agreements set standards and regulations for pollution control,
while leaving enforcement in the hands of national governments. Global
rules to combat marine pollution have generally evolved from focusing
on ship-generated oil pollution, through a more comprehensive approach
to pollution, to the regulation of dumping activities, and finally, to the
very broad provisions currently found in the law of the sea." At present,
there are no specific global conventions that directly regulate pollution
from land-based sources or from offshore drilling platforms, since these
activities are more readily amenable to regulation through regional
instruments.
The first major international attempt specifically to curb pollution of
the seas by oil actually antedated the Stockholm Declaration and came
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater, Aug.
5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
A third prominent international agreement that contributed to developing the concept of inter-
national environmental protection was the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. As provided for in its Article
IX,
States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful con-
tamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the
introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate meas-
ures for this purpose.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art. IX, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2416-2417,
610 U.N.T.S. 205, 209-210.
Finally, in 1969, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage es-
tablished a system of international liability for environmental damage caused by oil spills. This
international agreement aims to impose penalties on bulk oil carriers which pollute the seas by oil.
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S.
3, 9 I.L.M. 45.
41 See, eg., Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 1979, 34 U.S.T. 3043,
18 I.L.M. 1442; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S.
11,097, 26 I.L.M. 1529; Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541; and conventions cited infra notes 45-75.
42 See infra notes 45-82.
43 See Lawrence Juda, IMCO and the Regulation of Ocean Pollution from Ships, 26 INT'L &
Comp. L.Q. 558 (1977).
44 See generally Bernhard J. Abrahamsson, The Marine Environment and Ocean Shipping:
Some Implications for a New Law of the Sea, 31 INT'L ORG. 291 (1977).
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with the promulgation in 1954 of the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Off.' This agreement specifically
prohibited the "discharge from any tanker... of oil [or] any oily mixture
the oil in which fouls the surface of the sea"'4 and set penalties commen-
surate with those that might be imposed under the law of the territory in
question.47 Amended in 1962 and 1969, this convention was the first
tentative move toward cleansing the oceans from oil pollutants and at-
taining a balance between responsibilities of flag and port states.48
Respective to the process of creating a norm that asserts nonpollu-
tion of the marine environment, two of the 1958 Geneva Conventions of
the Law of the Sea contain specific anti-pollution provisions. The Con-
vention on the High Seas49 obligates contracting parties to prevent pollu-
tion of the sea by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines, or from
activities associated with the exploration and exploitation of the seabed
and subsoil, and to take measures that prevent pollution from the dump-
ing of radioactive wastes.50 The 1958 Convention on the Continental
Shelf" obligates parties to protect living resources of the sea from
"harmful agents" while in the process of offshore drilling.52 Taken in
tandem, these conventions codified two fundamental principles for inter-
national management of ocean pollution: (1) Freedom of the seas must
be exercised with reasonable regard to the interests of other states; and
(2) There exists the manifest need for states to preserve a reasonable bal-
ance between their needs and the ways and means in which they use
ocean space.
In the wake of the Stockholm Conference, a more significant step
was taken in 1973 with the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL),s later modified by the Protocol of
1978 which introduced certain improvements into the Annex dealing
with oil pollution.54 Article 1 of MARPOL instructs the parties to "pre-
vent the pollution of the marine environment by the discharge of harmful
substances or effluents containing such substances in contravention of the
45 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 12
U.S.T. 2989, 327 U.N.T.S. 3.
46 Id. art. 3.
47 Id. art. 6.
48 The Convention goes so far as to establish "prohibited zones" through which tankers should
not pass. Id. Annex A.
49 Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
50 Id. arts. 24-25.
51 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 312.
52 Id. art. 5.
53 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 12
I.L.M. 1319 [hereafter MARPOL 1973].
54 Protocol of 1978 Relating to MARPOL 1973, Feb. 17, 1978, I.L.M. 546 [hereinafter MARPOL
1978].
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Convention.""5 The MARPOL 1973/78 Convention has five annexes,
numbers I and II of which are mandatory and deal with pollution by oil
and noxious substances, respectively.56 No question exists that this in-
strument represents a significant piece of global legislation that enjoys
broad authority in combatting pollution of the marine environment.
In 1972, the most important instrument for prohibiting the dump-
ing of harmful substances from vessels at sea was promulgated as the so-
called London Dumping Convention." This agreement builds on earlier
conventions by reiterating a pledge among contracting states to "take all
practicable steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by the dumping of
waste and other matter that is liable to create hazards to human health,
to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to inter-
fere with other legitimate use of the sea."5 " The London Dumping Con-
vention in sum strives to control the amount and kinds of wastes dumped
into the oceans in order to prevent damage to marine life and human
opportunities.
Relatedly, the 1972 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollu-
tion by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft 9 reinforced the commitment
among states not to pollute the marine environment. Parties pledge "to
take all possible steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by substances
that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living re-
sources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other
legitimate uses of the sea."'
Perhaps the Convention most directly relevant to the act of dis-
charging oil, though not directly applicable to the Gulf area, is the 1974
55 MARPOL 1973, supra note 53, art. I. "Harmful substances" are defined to include "any
substance which, if introduced into the sea, is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm
living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the
sea, and includes any substance subject to control by the present Convention." Id. art. I, para. 2.
56 MARPOL 1973, supra note 53, Annex I: Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil,
at 1335; Annex II: Regulations for the Control of Pollution by Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk,
at 1386; Annex III: Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Harmful Substances Carried by
Sea in Packaged Forms, or in Freight Containers, Portable Tanks or Road and Rail Tank Wagons,
at 1421; Annex IV: Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from Ships, at 1424;
Annex V: Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from Ships, at 1434.
57 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Mat-
ter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120.
58 Id. art. I. "Dumping" is defined as "any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter
from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea." Id. art. 3, para. 1.
59 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft,
Feb. 15, 1972, 932 U.N.T.S. 5.
60 Id. art. 1. As defined in the Convention, "dumping" refers to "any deliberate disposal of
substances and materials into the sea by or from ships or aircraft," other than incidental discharges
from the normal operations of ships or for "purposes other than the mere disposal thereof, if not
contrary to the aim of this Convention." Id. art. 19, para. 1. "Ships" include fixed or floating
platforms. Id. art. 19, para. 2.
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Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based
Sources. 61 This agreement specifically forbids the act of deliberately dis-
charging oil into the marine environment. Under this convention the
parties pledge that they will
take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the sea, by which is
meant the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or
energy into the marine environment (including estuaries) resulting in
such deleterious effects as hazards to human health, harm to living
resources and to marine eco-systems, damae to amenities or interfer-
ence with other legitimate uses of the sea. 6
The convention also would obligate parties to assist each other to
prevent incidents that might result in pollution from land-based sources,
as well as to minimize and eliminate the consequences of such incidents
and to exchange information to facilitate that goal.63
International agreements designed to prevent accidents at sea un-
doubtedly strengthen the global regime of marine environmental protec-
tion law against pollution by oil. Five principal instruments, all drafted
under the auspices of IMO, are presently in force: the 1966 Convention
on Load Lines;61 the 1972 Convention on Safe Containers;65 the 1972
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea;66 the 1974 Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea;67 and the 1978
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
for Seafarers.68
Especially important as environmental protection law for the Per-
sian Gulf region is the 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-Opera-
tion on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution.69
This instrument was designed to develop an integrated management ap-
proach to the marine environment of the Persian Gulf region. The pur-
pose of the convention specifically obligates contracting parties to take
"all appropriate measures" to "prevent, abate, and combat pollution in
61 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, June 4, 1974,
13 I.L.M. 352.
62 Id. art. 1.
63 Id. art. 13.
64 Apr. 5, 1966, 18 U.S.T. 1857, 640 U.N.T.S. 133.
65 Dec. 2, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 3707, 1064 U.N.T.S. 3.
66 Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16.
67 Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 14 I.L.M. 963.
68 July 7, 1978, reprinted in 6A BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, Doc. No. 9-38 (7th ed. 1987).
69 Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine From Pollu-
tion, Apr. 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133, 17 I.L.M. 511 [hereinafter Kuwait Convention] (entered
into force June 1, 1979), reprinted in PETER H. SAND, MARINE ENVIRONMENT LAW IN THE
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROGRAMME 58 (1988). The following states are parties
to the Kuwait Convention: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates. Id. at 256.
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the Sea Area"" ° caused by "intentional or accidental discharges from
ships."'7 1 Furthermore, the convention obligates parties to
take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate and combat pollution
in the Sea Area caused by dumping of wastes and other matter from
ship and aircraft, and ... ensures effective compliance in the Sea Area
with applicable rules relating to the control of this type of pollution as
provided for in relevant international conventions.72
Given the heavy tanker traffic sailing through the Persian Gulf, the
main intent of the 1978 Kuwait Convention aims at curbing pollution of
the sea by oil. Highlighting this point is a special protocol for combating
pollution by oil and other harmful substances in cases of emergency. 73
Dumping is not defined in the convention, nor were annexes appended to
identify what harmful or noxious substances might present particular
threats to marine life, fisheries, or human health in the region. Even so,
the fact remains that, regarding dumping, the Kuwait Convention in-
tends to ensure effective compliance with existing international conven-
tions relating to this type of pollution.74 At the very least, then, the
legally binding obligations in the London Dumping Convention and
MARPOL 73/78 would be pertinent to the dumping or discharging of
any substances into the gulf by ships or littoral states. Accordingly, the
deliberate release of toxic petroleum into the Persian Gulf marine ecosys-
tem would be expressly forbidden.
Finally, not to be overlooked is the broad anti-pollution mandate
articulated in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.75 The relevant
environmental protection provisions comprise Part XII of this agree-
ment, providing for the "protection and preservation of the marine envi-
ronment."'76  In a real sense, these provisions are not merely a
restatement of existing conventional law or state practice. Rather, they
create a new public international legal framework to deal with degrada-
tion of and threats to the marine environment. Article 192 unequivocally
fixes the principal duty of states relative to the marine environment:
"States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environ-
ment." 7 The obligatory language is unshakable. States that violate this
fiat to protect and preserve the marine environment thus violate interna-
70 Kuwait Convention, supra note 69, art. III, para. A.
71 Id. art. IV.
72 Id. art. V.
73 Id. Protocol concerning Regional Cooperation in Combatting Pollution by Oil and Other
Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency.
74 Id. Preamble.
75 United Nations Convention on the Law and the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [herein-
after 1982 LOS CONVENTION].
76 Id. arts. 192-237.
77 Id. art. 192.
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tional law. Indeed, Article 235 substantiates this conclusion as it affirms
that "States are responsible for the fulfillment of their international obli-
gations concerning the protection and preservation of the marine envi-
ronment. They shall be liable in accordance with international law."7
Article 194 further strengthens these provisions by imposing an af-
firmative duty on states not to pollute. This article indicates that the
Convention is concerned with "all sources of pollution of the marine en-
vironment, and states are mandated to take all measures necessary to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from
any source."7 9 With respect to land-based pollution, the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention directs states to take legislative action "to prevent, re-
duce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based
sources ... taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards
and recommended practices and procedures."8 Moreover, states are di-
rected to adopt laws and take measures necessary "to prevent, reduce
and control pollution" from dumping.8" To this end, governments are
obliged to "endeavor to establish global and regional rules," with na-
tional anti-pollution legislation being "no less effective . . . than the
global rules and standards."8"
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention underscores the principal
premise of the law of environmental protection, namely that the compo-
nent parts of the global ecosystem are interrelated, and sensitive to alter-
ation elsewhere in the system. Furthermore, the entire environmental
system, though self-renewing, is threatened by burgeoning population
growth, rising expectations for socio-economic development and the re-
sultant output of greater amounts of pollution." Unfortunately, the
oceans have become the repository of much of this manmade waste.
As regards ocean space, the principles of the law of environmental
protection clearly assert that states are responsible for controlling pollu-
tion of the sea that might cause damage to another state's territory.84
The principle of good neighborliness requires that states not permit acts
78 Id. art. 235, para. 1.
79 Id. art. 194, para. 1.
80 Id. art. 207, para. 1.
81 Id. art. 210, paras. I & 2.
82 Id. art. 210, paras. 4 & 6. For a thoughtful assessment of the 1982 LOS CoNVENTI No's
contribution to the law of pollution prevention see Moira L. McConnell & Edgal Gold, The Modern
Law of the Sea: Framework for the Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment?, 23 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 83 (1991).
83 See generally the assessment made by the WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987).
84 See generally G. HandI, Liability as an Obligation Established by a Primary Rule of Interna-
tional Law: Some Basic Reflections on the International Law Commission's Work, 16 NETH. Y.B.
INT'L L. 49 (1985); Pierre-Marie Dupoy, The International Law of State Responsibility: Revolution or
Evolution?, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 105 (1989).
Vol. 24:29
THE PERSIAN GULF WAR OIL SPILL
within their territory or jurisdictional competence to be done when they
might negatively impact on the rights of neighbors.85 Put tersely, states
do not have the right to contaminate international common space areas
such as the high seas for their own national expediency or convenience.8 6
They are obligated to preserve and protect those regions, not only in
their own interests, but for the interests of all mankind.87
There is little question that this partial enumeration of pertinent in-
ternational and regional agreements affirms the normative rule that states
are not permitted to pollute the oceans either at will or with impunity.
Each agreement alone constitutes an element of international law binding
upon its signatories. Taken together, these agreements have acquired the
quality and force of an international norm that mandates that govern-
ments have a duty not to pollute international ocean space.88
In addition to the treaties and conventions which supply useful evi-
dence of international law, a second principal source of the law of envi-
ronmental protection is found in the normal practice and custom of
states.8 9 Indeed, a combination of both the actual behavior of states and
the opinions of legal scholars and practitioners in the form of opinion
juris furnishes the foundation for international customary law.90 What
has become evident from the multitude of documents and treaties, tradi-
tional practices, and professional opinions is that an international con-
sensus has emerged, recognizing the need for states to have an obligation
to protect the environment. 91 According to this conclusion, Iraq
breached the emerging international norm of environmental protection.
IV. EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
Acknowledging that humanity constitutes but a part of the global
ecology, the struggle to regulate social conflict reveals a growing under-
85 See, eg., Trial Smelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1911.
86 See generally KARI HAKAPAX, MARINE POLLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981).
87 See generally JAN SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS
AN INTERNATIONAL ECOLOGICAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION (1979); Schachter, supra note 1.
88 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES § 601 (1987).
89 Sources for international environmental law conform to sources of general international law,
as expressed in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. These include respec-
tively, "[treaties and] international conventions," "international custom," "the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations," and "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most qualified
publicists." U.N. CHARTER, Stat. I.C.J., art. 38.
90 See generally H.W.A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICA-
TION: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONTINUING ROLE OF CUSTOM IN THE PRESENT PERIOD OF
CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972).
91 This obligation has become highlighted in recent years by the emergence of global warming
and ozone depletion as serious international concerns. See Ved P. Nanda, Trends in International
Environmental Law, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 187 (1989-1990).
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standing of the impact that war exacts upon the environment. There is
little question that war occurs as an all too regular activity of man's exist-
ence. Moreover, despite all attempts to limit and outlaw it, war seems
driven by natural impulse and may occur as an inevitable consequence of
international competition. This conclusion does not bode well for the
environment, particularly since the ultimate product of war is the de-
struction of life and property.
The conduct of warfare, however, has not gone unregulated.92 Since
antiquity, religious and philosophical systems have sought to institution-
alize war and to subject it to the rule of legal principles. Philosophers
and writers including Thucydides,93 Aristotle,94 Plato," Augustine,96
and Thomas Aquinas97 explored the general rationale that leaders of the
empire or the church possessed the discretion to choose the justification
for war, but the means, including laws, should be developed through
customary practice among equals (i.e. sovereigns).9" It is only in modern
times, however, that the impacts of war on the environment have as-
sumed such salience as to be elevated to international legal concern.
By the time of Grotius during the 16th century, the two conceptual
threads of the evolving laws of war-namely, the justification for war
and the conduct of war-began to unravel.99 A rift between the two
doctrines developed. Nearly two centuries later, the "positivist" element
92 See generally THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESO-
LUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988); THE LAW
OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).
93 THUCYDIDES, THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, bk. VII, para. 68 (Richard
Livingstone ed., Richard Crawley & Richard Feetham trans., 1954).
94 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, bk. I, para. 8, at 11 & bk. VII, para. 14, at 178-179 (Stephen
Everson ed., 1988).
95 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, bk. II, at 51 (Allan Bloom trans., 1968) (Platonic pagination refer-
ence 373d-374d).
96 SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, bk. III, at 103-106, bk. XXI, at 786 (Marcus Dods
trans., 1950).
97 See THE "SUMMA THEOLOGIA" OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, PART II (SECOND PART), Ques-
tion XL (On War), at 500 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Burns Oates &
Washbourne Ltd., 1916).
98 During the decline of the empires, the institution of the emperor as sovereign lost credibility
and power. Joachin von Elbe describes what remained of this antiquated system at the onset of the
Middle Ages:
The ius commune of the Empire continued to exercise a "supra-national power" for the
maintenance of justice and peace in the world. The limitation and regulation of wars be-
tween the members of the Empire thus becomes a matter of positive law; it is treated by
secular lawyers of the Middle Ages in the familiar terms of the Corpus furis.
Joachim von Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law, 33 AM. J.
INT'L L. 665, 670-71 (1939).
99 Von Elbe posited that in 1582, Ayala (a major influence on Grotius) was the first to make
the actual distinction between the two concepts. This provocative departure from traditional
thought notes that "the justice of the cause, though still considered as a necessary prerequisite for
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matured in the work of Emmerich de Vattel, who distinguished between
the "necessary law of nature" and the "voluntary law of nations."'"
Whereas the former concerned natural law and the conscience of sover-
eigns, the latter addressed the law that nations applied voluntarily in
their relations with one another.101
The elevated status of positivist law suggested that only in regard to
the necessary law of nature may the question of a war's just cause be
raised. The voluntary law of nations, i.e., positivist international law,
sought not to venture into the intrinsic justice of wars."°2 In sum, the
continued development of the positivist school came about at the expense
of the law-of-nature focus.103 By the late 19th century, positivist legal
theorists had largely rejected the distinction between "just" and "unjust"
wars, and had relegated war to an act entirely driven by the uncontrolled
sovereign will of each individual state."° Justification for war had been
downgraded to only a secondary consideration, a trend perhaps attrib-
uted to the exponential increase in the destructife capability of modern
warfare.105 The righteousness of a sovereign's cause proved little solace
to combatants, innocent civilians, and the maimed as they were increas-
ingly drawn into belligerent situations.10 6 Hence, international law was
turned away from considerations of moral purpose or ethical transgres-
sion and was redirected to more pragmatic concerns of damage
limitation. 107
The occasion ripened for codification of these positivist norms and
customs.'0 8 As a result, the laws of armed conflict were born out of the
going to war in accordance with the prevailing doctrine, has no legal effect whatever upon the con-
duct of the war; it relates to politics and equity rather than to law." Id., at 676 (emphasis added).
100 MONSIER DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 381-382 (Joseph Chitty
trans., 1852).
101 See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF PEACE 37-40 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963).
102 As Werner Levi has observed:
The rise of positivism and the simultaneous decline of the naturalist theory of law-or, in
other words, the ostensible elimination of value judgments about legal norms so as to facili-
tate the growth of law in a multicultural world-legitimized the conduct of wars for the
enforcement of political demands even without a legal basis or "just cause."
WERNER LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (2d ed. 1991).
103 BRIERLY, supra note 101, at 37-38.
104 GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 33 (6th ed. 1992).
105 Id. at 670 & 699.
106 See generally J. DAVID SINGER & MELVIN SMALL, THE WAGES OF WAR, 1816-1965, A
STATISTICAL HANDBOOK (1972).
107 VON GLAHN, supra note 104, at 33 & 670.
10 KALSHOVEN, supra note 3, at 7-18.
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Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907 through a series of conventions.' °9
These documents, while addressing some issues of justification, focused
mainly on the conduct of war. With a codified regime for warfare in
place, the onset of conflict would produce legal consequences for belliger-
ents and third parties alike, irrespective of the possibility that its out-
break may or may not have involved the abrogation of a specific
international normative obligation. 1 0
Bolstered by the two Hague Conferences, positivists clearly gained
the ascendence and asserted that justice, righteousness and rectitude had
little role to play in a world regulated by conventions and arms control
agreements. The sobering experience of massive death and destruction
wrought by World War I, however, brought about a reconsideration of
these attitudes."' International legal opinion came to accept the belief
that states are culpable for initiating a policy of warfare." 2 This revival
of accountability, coupled with the associated sense of righteousness in
the Versailles Treaty, rekindled international legal efforts to distinguish
between just and unjust wars, a responsibility that had largely been ig-
nored since the late 1700s. 113
Regrettably, neither philosophically highlighting war's ethical sta-
tus, nor the Kellogg-Briand pact outlawing aggressive war as an instru-
ment of national policy," 4 nor even the availability of the League of
Nations were able to prevent World War II. Damage to society and the
environment outstripped attempts to control international conflict. At
the conclusion of World War II, however, the international community
moved quickly on both philosophical fronts. The positivist doctrine was
bolstered by the Nuremberg Tribunal as it held that principles in the
Hague Conventions on Land Warfare of 1899/1907 conveyed the force
of customary law that would be binding even upon non-signatory states.
Those adhering to the "necessary law of nature" school were won over
109 See International Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War by Land, July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, [hereinafter Hague II]; Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague IV].
110 See voN GLAHN, supra note 104, at 834-869 (discussing the concept of neutrality); Patrick
M. Norton, Between the Ideology and the Reality: The Shadow of the Law of Neutrality, 17 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 249 (1976).
111 See VON GLAHN, supra note 104, at 33 & 670-674.
112 Id. at 670.
113 See generally WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR (1981);
MICHAEL WALZER, Jusr AND UNJUST WARS (1977).
114 Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy. Aug.
27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. As provided for in this agreement, the contracting parties
"condemn[ed] recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounced it as an
instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." Id. art. 1. Moreover, parties
agreed that "the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever
origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."
Id. art. 2.
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by the creation of both crimes against peace and crimes against humanity
as evinced in the Nuremberg experience 15 and subsequently codified in
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.1
16
Again, war did not end with the entry into force of new interna-
tional legal constraints. The experience of the Korean and Vietnam wars
sparked negotiations in 1977 of two Additional Protocols to the 1949
Geneva Conventions. 117 The emphasis of international law shifted back
to positivism as Protocol I, dealing with the protection of victims of in-
ternational conflict, refocused attention on the means and methods of
warfare.' 18 Importantly, it is within this positivist approach of stressing
methods and means for waging war that environmental issues have come
to be forthrightly addressed. It is apparent that the "just" or "unjust"
nature of a conflict in modern times hardly affects the means of waging
contemporary warfare. It is thus within the positivist school of the law
of armed conflict that the link has been made to the law protecting the
environment.119
V. ASSESSMENT
The law of armed conflict generally is a civilized international at-
tempt to control the social phenomenon of war. 12° Through interna-
tional consensus, states have been lawfully deprived of unlimited choice
115 See Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178 (1946); VON
GLAHN, supra note 104, at 885-886.
116 See generally Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinaf-
ter Geneva Convention II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV.
117 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter
Protocol 1]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinaf-
ter Protocol II].
118 See generally HOWARD S. LEVIE, PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL I TO THE
1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS (1981).
119 This point is demonstrated by restrictions in Protocol I of 1977 on methods and means of
warfare that are intended or expected to have long-term or severe damage on the environment. See
infra notes 143-145 and accompanying text. Interestingly enough, these violations are not consid-
ered to be grave breaches under Protocol I. KALSHOVEN, supra note 3, at 133.
120 See generally BARRIE PASKINS & MICHAEL DOCKRILL, THE ETHICS OF WAR (1979);
HOWARD S. LEVIE, THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (1986); Geoffrey Best, The
Restraint of War in Historical and Philosophical Perspective, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 3 (Astrid J.M. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanga eds., 1991).
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in their means of inflicting damage upon an enemy.1 2  As warfare has
moved from the battlefield to affect population centers, the law of armed
conflict has placed increased emphasis on special protection of civilians
and property, such that today, through convention and custom, wanton
destruction of property clearly violates the law of armed conflict. 122
The law of armed conflict is governed by two fundamental princi-
ples, necessity and proportionality. 123 Respective to necessity, if it can be
convincingly demonstrated that the use of armed force is necessary to
preserve public order, that determination may legally justify the use of
armed force. 24 A threat must be real and imminent, however, not
imagined or hypothetical. 125
Under the same concept, necessity allows a military commander to
use only that degree and kind of force required to accomplish the mis-
sion's objective.126 This brings forth the notion of proportionality as a
criteria for use of force.127 In this respect, the limitation of proportional-
ity restricts the options available to a commander in gauging the military
necessity of a given action in two ways: (1) the principle of humanitarian
concern; and (2) the doctrine of economy of forces.1 28
Humanitarian issues reflect not only custom and respect for the
combatants, but also represent both good will and good faith. It is rea-
sonable to treat the defeated enemy's army well. Fair treatment encour-
121 See generally GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE: THE MODERN HISTORY OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS (1980); THE HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CON-
FLiCT (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979).
122 While custom and intent had stressed protection of noncombatants, such trends were not
codified until the 20th century. At the close of World War II, "the Principles of International Law
Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal ma[d]e it a war crime to plunder public or
private property, wantonly destroy cities, towns or villages, or perform devastation not justified by
military necessity." The Charter and Judgment of the Nurmberg Tribunal: History and Analysis,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5, citing Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(b), Aug. 8,
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
123 See ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NA-
VAL OPERATIONS, NWP 9 (REV.A)/FMFM 1-10 (1989), at 5-4 to 5-7 [hereinafter LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS].
124 See generally Weiden, Necessity in International Law, in 24 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GRO-
TIUS SocIETY 105 (1939); William Gerard Downey, Jr., The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47
AM. J. INT'L L. 251 (1953).
125 See generally N.C.H. Dunbar, The Significance of Military Necessity in the Law of War, 67
JURID. REV. 201 (1955).
126 This principle is known as "economy of force." See infra notes 131-133 and accompanying
text.
127 The rule of proportionality is codified in Protocol I, supra note 117, arts. 51(5)(b) &
57(2)(a)(ii)-(iii). See generally William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in
Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91 (1982). See also LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra
note 123, at 5-6 to 5-7 n.6.
128 LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 123, at 5-7.
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ages reciprocity and reduces ill will.12 9 The unwarranted destruction of
life, land and property runs contrary to the norms and expectations of
humanity, as well as the need for world public order."' 0
In addition to the humanitarian concern, which strikes a strong re-
sponsive moral chord in the jurist, it is the highly pragmatic military
doctrine of "economy of force" that plays an even more salient role in
influencing military decisions.131 Economy of force is the minimum
force needed to accomplish the military objective. 13 2 As noted officially
by the U.S. Department of the Navy, military necessity "permits a bellig-
erent to apply only that degree and kind of regulated force, not otherwise
prohibited by the laws of war, required for the partial or complete sub-
mission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and
physical resources." 1
33
129 As well put in an authoritative military supplement on international law:
As long as war is not abolished, the law of armed conflict remains essential. During such
conflicts the law of armed conflict provides common ground of rationality between ene-
mies. This body of law corresponds to their mutual interests during conflict and consti-
tutes a bridge for a new understanding after the end of the conflict. The law of armed
conflict is intended to preclude purposeless, unnecessary destruction of life and property
and to ensure that violence is used only to defeat the enemy's military forces. If followed
by all participants, the law of armed conflict will inhibit warfare from needlessly affecting
persons or things of little military value. By preventing needless cruelty, the bitterness and
hatred arising from armed conflict is lessened, and thus it is easier to restore an enduring
peace.
Id. at n.7.
130 See JEAN PICET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICIMS 28-29
(1975); Respective to the legal relationship between the doctrine of military necessity and the princi-
ple of humanitarian concern, the Nuremberg Trial case of United States v. List made these relevant
observations:
[Military necessity] permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other persons
whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of war; it allows the
capturing of armed enemies and others of peculiar danger, but it does not permit the killing
of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill. The
destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities of
war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law. There must be some
reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of enemy
forces.
United States v. List, 11 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under
Control Council Law No. 10, 1230, 1253 (1948).
131 "Economy of force" is one of the cardinal "principles of war" adopted by the U.S. armed
forces as service doctrine. See LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 123, table ST5-1, at 5-9;
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE, JOINT STAFF OFFICER'S GUIDE, Pub. 1, para. 102, at 1-4 and fig.
1-1, at 1-5 (1986).
132 "Economy of force" means that "no more - or less - effort should be devoted to a task
than is necessary to achieve the objective." LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 123, at 5-8
n.8.
133 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE § 220(a) (1955). The
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 concerning the protection of civilian persons during war was
constructed upon this principled foundation. Article 53 in the Convention provides that:
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Yet the twin pillars of military necessity are not mutually exclusive.
Use of the "economy of forces" principle can also be elevated to the hu-
manitarian appeal contained in the law of armed conflict. Application of
economy of force during the implementation of a military campaign con-
tributes to military efficacy. Indeed, to destroy objects of ecological value
that are not deemed necessary military objectives is not an economical
use of force; it expends military capability without returning any net gain
in military advantage. By the same token, pragmatic utilitarians will de-
fend such conservation practices as well. 134
To summarize, the use of force in international law is delicately bal-
anced between the precepts of military necessity and proportionality as
articulated within the following context: (a) force must be regulated;
(b) force must be necessary; (c) a commander must use the minimum
force necessary; and (d) force must not otherwise be forbidden by legally
binding law of armed conflict, orders from a superior, non-binding rules
of engagement, or any other legal fiat. 135
This same principle can be extrapolated to environmental considera-
tions as well. Wanton destruction of the environment diverts limited
military resources away from the penultimate military purpose of termi-
nating the war once favorable military objectives have been achieved.
Philosophically, both laws for environmental protection and armed
conflict share the fundamental concept of conservation.136 This driving
principle of conservation undergirds the normative quality as well as
practical utility of both bodies of international law. Importantly, the
legal implications of the Gulf War oil spill supply a confluence for the
law of environmental protection and the law of armed conflict-a conflu-
ence that magnifies the unlawfulness of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.
The intuitive normative wrongs consequently find form and substance in
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individu-
ally or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to
social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, excepted where such destruction is ren-
dered absolutely necessary by military operations.
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 116, art. 53.
134 As R. B. Brand has observed,
The measure of permissible devastation is found in the strict necessities of war. Devasta-
tion as an end in itself or as a separate measure of war is not sanctioned by the law of war.
There must be some reasonably close connection between the destruction of property and
the overcoming of the enemy's army.
R.B. Brandt, Utilitarianism and the Rules of War, in WAR AND MORAL REsPoNmBILrry 25, 38-39
(Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1975).
135 See generally LAW OF NAVAL OPERAMrONS, supra note 123; William H. Parks, Command
Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL L. REV. 1 (1973).
136 In this sense, "conservation" embodies the notion that the law preserves, guards, and pro-
tects society from excessive loss, injury, or decay resulting from armed conflict or environmental
degradation.
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violations of the codified international laws for both environmental pro-
tection and regulation of armed conflict.
VI. THE LEGAL NEXUS BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AND ARMED CONFLICT
Viewed within the dual contexts of environmental law and the laws
of war, it is not difficult to conclude that by unleashing the massive oil
spill the Iraqi leadership abrogated certain regional and international
legal responsibilities. But which set of laws might furnish the most effec-
tive or most appropriate means for lodging claims against Iraq? The pre-
vailing opinion suggests that protection of the environment must fall
within recognized principles in the law of armed conflict.137 This point
rings especially true given that Iraq released the oil spill as a deliberate
policy during a situation of belligerency.
Drawing upon the doctrine of military necessity and the common
theme of conservation, the law of environmental protection would hold a
special place in developing charges and shaping arguments against the
Iraqi government. It is because of this system of shared ethics that the
law of environmental protection can be employed to bolster facets of the
law of armed conflict that relate to limiting environmental damage dur-
ing war. Furthermore, it serves to prohibit manipulation or degradation
of the environment for belligerent purposes.
Preeminence of the law of armed conflict may be explained by its
long tradition in both international custom and state practice. 138 As pre-
viously noted, humanitarian and environmental philosophies, principles
and practices during war have been contemplated and codified for centu-
ries. 1 39 The law of the environment, on the other hand, has only recently
attracted the attention of the international community. 14°
The 1954 Oil Spill Convention marked the first major attempt to
address worldwide environmental concerns.1 41 The 1972 Stockholm
Declaration and progressive development of ocean law culminating in
137 To support this assertion, one need only realize that more than 160 states in the interna-
tional community have ratified the four 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Law of War. Theodor
Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 348 n.2. (1987). In
contrast, laws for the protection of the environment still await the inception, let alone widespread
ratification, of such a quasi-universal convention.
138 See supra notes 92-98.
139 See supra notes 99-119.
140 The law of armed conflict has been evolving since before the time of Grotius, in the six-
teenth century. However, it was only in 1972 that the Stockholm Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment set the modem beginning of environmental concerns in international law. See Christopher
C. Joyner & Nancy D. Joyner, Global Eco-Management and International Organizations: The Stock-
holm Conference and Problems of Cooperation, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 533 (1974).
141 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
1992]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LV
the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Convention over the subse-
quent decade reflected truly bold and global thinking pertaining to envi-
ronmental issues.142 Yet, as codified international law, the law of
environmental protection has evolved only since World War II. Though
obviously possessing considerable importance, the law of environmental
protection does not yet command the same degree of broad-based histori-
cal familiarity or global acceptance as does the law of armed conflict.
No less important is that the international community, drawing
upon the heightened awareness and sensitivities of environmental issues,
is working to integrate such concerns into the body of armed conflict law.
Protocol I, promulgated in 1977, incorporates the fundamental consen-
sus regarding environmental protection against military activities. 143 Ar-
ticle 35 of that instrument sets the following as basic rules in
international law for the methods and means of warfare:
1. In any armed conflict, the right of the parties to the conflict to
choose methods of warfare is not unlimited.
2. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unneces-
sary suffering.
3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and se-
vere damage to the natural environment. 144
Importantly, Protocol I reaffirms the international community's humani-
tarian concerns during the course of conflict. To this end there exists a
convergence of ideals in Protocol I. In particular, the intention is that
the "Law of the Hague," developed mainly with interstate rules gov-
erning the use of force, and the "Law of Geneva," developed to ensure
protection of persons from the effects of armed conflicts, should dovetail
in substantial degree.1 45 Such a convergence not only supplies greater
coincidence in the law regulating the use of force; it also serves to rein-
force the nature and normative quality of that law.
The broad foundation of the law of armed conflict, rich in both de-
tail and history, prompts the conclusion that it will retain greater conse-
quence and heavier legal weight than the more recently emergent
142 See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
143 See KALSHOVEN, supra note 3, at 81 (noting that the proponents of this "new basic rule"
were probably motivated in this environmental prohibition by the "large-scale deforestations carried
out by the Americans in the course of the war in Vietnam.").
144 Protocol I, supra note 117, art. 35.
145 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 35 of Protocol I reaffirm the two classical principles of the
"Law of the Hague." Id. paras. 1-2. These principles are then supplemented by the modernized
paragraph 3. Id. para. 3; KALSHOVEN, supra note 3, at 80-81. Importantly, the general principles
of the "Law of the Hague" have in large part passed into customary international law. Meron, supra
note 137.
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environmental law. Perpetration of "widespread, long-term and severe
damage" 1" to the environment is specifically violative of Protocol I of
the law of armed conflict; 147 it has not, however, been made a specific
norm formally expressed in widely recognized tenets of environmental
international law as such.
Ideally, the law of environmental protection should produce a rec-
ord of acceptance equally impressive to that for armed conflict. More
likely, however, environmental law's greatest impact will be relegated to
setting out necessary limitations on the means, methods and objects of
war. Thus, pertaining to the Gulf War oil spill, the international course
of reaction most likely will turn to violations of the law of armed conflict.
The interface between the two complimentary bodies of international law
thus becomes apparent. A critical need arises to consider ecological prin-
ciples and experiences of environmental protection law when interpreting
the environmental aspects of the law of armed confiict. This recommen-
dation underpins evaluation of the Gulf War oil spill under international
law as well as considering conceivable explanations for Iraq's action.
VII. INTENT AND APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
RESPONSES
The Persian Gulf is a narrow, shallow body of water that is virtually
landlocked. No rivers flow into it from the Saudi side, and the only sig-
nificant water exchange is with the Indian Ocean, through the Strait of
Hormuz. As such, dispersal of massive oil spills in the Persian Gulf is
difficult and protracted.14
The devastating oil spill released into the Persian Gulf shortly after
hostilities broke out between the allied coalition and Iraq deeply dis-
turbed the international community. 49 Almost immediately, rationales
were put forward to understand Saddam Hussein's pursuit of such a nox-
ious strategy. Three theories surfaced to explain Iraq's motivation:
(1) the oil spill had a military purpose, i.e., it would create a defensive
146 Protocol I, supra note 117, art. 35, para. 3.
147 While this may be so, the undefined extent and vague scope of such "widespread, long-term
and severe damage" leaves substantial room for vagaries in interpretation and application.
148 For a discussion of the relevant geography of the Persian Gulf, see Christopher C. Joyner,
Introduction: The Geography and Geopolitics of the Persian Gulf, in THE PERSIAN GULF WAR,
supra note 19, at 1, 2-4.
149 See Schneider, supra note 8; Shenon, supra note 13. In the wake of Iraq's oil spill, the U.S.
Senate passed a resolution urging the administration to pursue an international tribunal for war
crimes committed by Iraq during its occupation war. David Hoffman, US.: No Plans to Try Sad-
dam in Absentia, WAsH. PosT, Apr. 24, 1991, at A24. The European Community asked the United
Nations to explore charges against Iraq during the Gulf War as well. Id. In addition, the U.N.
Security Council voted to hold Iraq responsible for violations of international law. Id.
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barrier of gooey beaches to impede against an amphibious assault by
the allied coalition;
(2) it was a terror tactic, as averred by President Bush's description of
the incident as an act of "environmental terrorism" to befoul desalina-
tion plants in Saudi Arabia. (Though open to conjecture, a related
theory suggested that Iraq aimed to dispirit public opinion or perhaps
even outrage the coalition into premature assault); and/or
(3) there was actually no strategy, release of the oil slick was merely
one in a series of tactical probes by Iraq that sought to test allied forces
and possibly disrupt them. 150
Determination of intent remains an important step towards identifying
specific violations of the law of armed conflict, as well as appropriate
international responses.
Regarding the possibility of a military purpose, attacks upon the en-
vironment as a means of waging war are not new. History is replete with
episodes in which belligerents have attempted to defeat the enemy by
attacking the environment.15 Within the framework of military pur-
pose, Iraq's oil pollution may be explained as a defensive act aimed at
slowing, diverting, or deterring an impending amphibious assault.
152
The Iraqi leadership might have reasoned that a "scorched-earth"--or
put more aptly, a "spoiled-sea" policy-was both required and lawful,
given its situation of desperation. Indeed, the law of armed conflict does
acknowledge that a scorched-earth policy of belligerents may at times be
rendered a proper action of military necessity. 5 3 Such a sentiment is
150 Gellman, supra note 25.
151 See SIPRI, WARFARE IN A FRAGILE WORLD: MILITARY IMPAcT ON THE HUMAN ENvI-
RONMENT 14-19 (Rajesh Kumar ed., 1980). Examples of ravaging the environment as part of a
belligerent's military strategy are legion. In 1980, SIPRI catalogued 26 major "ecologically disrup-
tive wars" in history, which included among them the following: The Peloponnesian War (431-404
B.C.), Third Punic War (149-146 B.C.), Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), Napoleonic Wars (1796-
1815), U.S. Civil War (1861-1865), World War I (1914-1918), World War 11 (1939-1945), Korean
War (1950-1953), Second Indochina War (1961-1975), and the Kampuchean Insurrections (1975-
1977). Id.
152 See Apple, supra note 7; Shenon, supra note 13.
153 As provided for in the Hague Regulations, "military necessity" does not convey a license to
destroy. It permits destruction of life and property by an occupant when it is "necessary to protect
the safety of his forces and to facilitate the success of his operation." LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
supra note 123, at 5-5 n.5. However, the principle of military necessity
does not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the satisfac-
tion of a lust to kill. The destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively de-
manded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of
international law. There must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of
property and the overcoming of the enemy forces. It is lawful to destroy railways, lines of
communication, or any other property that might be utilized by the enemy. Private homes
and churches even may be destroyed if necessary for military operations. It does not admit
the wanton devastation of a district or the willful infliction of suffering upon its inhabitants
for the sake of suffering alone.
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alluded to in Protocol I, Article 54 which would permit a scorched-earth
policy by a state defending its territory from invasion when the state has
such territory under its control.1 14
Two salient questions, one of theory and one of practice, surface if
this argument is pursued in detail. First, for an argument based on a
scorched-earth (or spoiled-sea) policy to be acceptable, some credible ex-
pectation must exist for the belligerent to prove that such actions had a
reasonable chance for success. The unlawful occupation of Kuwait ex-
posed the Iraqi military to attack and invasion from land, sea and air.
The overwhelming numbers and firepower of allied coalition forces
should have indicated to Iraq that any barrier to sea-borne invasion
would, at best, only hamper invasion efforts, with no real prospect of
thwarting an impending attack indefinitely.
Secondly, the Mina al Ahmadi pipeline and Sea Island Tanker Ter-
minal lay ten miles off the Kuwaiti shore and about forty miles north of
the Saudi border.15 Perhaps the Iraqi government believed that through
its action it could turn the Persian Gulf into a sea of oil, or possibly even
a blazing inferno; that scenario, however must have appeared at best fan-
ciful. A more reasonable expectation should have reckoned that the re-
sultant oil slick might have covered only one-third of the approximately
120 miles of open shoreline available for an amphibious invasion. As a
consequence, the spill could only deny an invasion force one-third of its
potentially available amphibious landing sites. Further, it would obvi-
ously have no deterrent effect on the prospect of invasion by land or air.
To attach military purpose to the oil spill appears to be less than of
"imperative" necessity and would therefore fail to fulfill the requirements
for permissible environmental destruction set out in Protocol 1.156 Iraq
remained legally constrained by principles in the law of armed conflict
Id.
154 Regarding the protection of objects that are "indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population" of a belligerent state, Article 54 of Protocol I provides that:
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production
of food-stuffs, crops, live stock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation
works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian
population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out
civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.
5. In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in the defence of its
national territory against invasion, derogation from the prohibitions contained in paragraph
2 may be made by a Party to the conflict within such territory under its own control where
required by imperative military necessity.
Protocol I, supra note 117, art. 54 (emphasis added).
155 See Apple, supra note 6, at A6.
156 Protocol I, supra note 117, art. 54.
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which assert that the right of the defender to adopt means of repulsing an
attacker is not unbounded.157
That Iraq failed to honor those principles is an important comment
on the lackluster character of that government as a law-abiding member
of the international community. 158
As noted earlier, destruction of the environment as a premeditated
policy during war is not new. Frequently associated with scorched-earth
campaigns, General William T. Sherman once remarked in 1863 that
"the only possible way to end this unhappy and dreadful conflict [the
American Civil War] ... is to make it terrible beyond endurance."159
This concept of massive coercive warfare utilizes terror to subjugate the
enemy.
Certain legal problems arise in assessing the terror tactic as an ex-
planation for Iraq's action. First, the term "environmental terrorism"
may be catchy, but it simply is not useful in international law. No con-
sensus has developed on a definition of terrorism, either within the
United Nations, among the policy analysts, or by international legal
scholars. 6" Resort to the term "terrorism" merely muddles the relevant
issues and confuses international opinion over the legal questions moti-
vating a violent act. 161
Use of terror tactics against civilians in warfare is generally con-
demned. 62 The issue was discussed during the drafting of Protocol I in
the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of In-
ternational Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. 163 In-
deed, Article 51 of the adopted Protocol I asserts that "the civilian
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be made the
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of
157 SIPRI, THE LAW OF WAR AND DUBIOUS WEAPONS 1 (1976).
158 The tendency by the Iraqi government during late 1991 to resort to unlawful activities is
clearly reflected in the 16 various resolutions adopted unanimously or near-unanimously by the U.N.
Security Council condemning Iraq for its various actions. Not only did Iraq aggressively invade
Kuwait, it also violated norms of international law against hostage-taking by its seizure of foreigners
as "human shields," committed acts of violence against diplomatic premises and personnel in Ku-
wait, attempted to alter the demographic composition of Kuwait, and committed numerous and
substantial violations of human rights against local Kuwaitis. See Joyner, supra note 5, at 8-12. For
fuller discussion of Iraqi violations see Christopher C. Joyner, The Persian Gulf War and Interna-
tional Law: Reasons or Excuses?, WORLD OUTLOOK: J. WORLD AFF. 130 (1992).
159 Henry Hitchcock, MARCHING WITH SHERMAN: LETrERS AND DIARIES OF HENRY
HITCHCOCK 35 (M.A. DeWolfe Howe ed., 1927).
160 Compare John F. Murphy, Defining International Terrorism: A Way Out of the Quagmire,
19 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTs. 13 (1989) with Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Definition of Terrorism, 19
ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 39 (1989).
161 See Geoffrey Levitt, Is "Terrorism" Worth Defining?, 13 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 97 (1986).
162 SIPRI, supra note 157, at 24.
163 See Torsten Stein, How Much Humanity Do Terrorists Deserve?, in HUMANITARIAN LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT supra note 120, at 567, 573-574.
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which is to spread terror among the civilian population, are prohib-
ited." 1  Use of terror violence against a civilian population is thus for-
bidden during international conflict.
In addition to semantic and legal problems of identifying the oil spill
as a terror tactic, a philosophical case against "eco-terrorism" may be
posited as well. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institutute
(SIPRI) expressed the point aptly when it observed, "Capitulation can-
not be achieved by terror if there is still military hope left. If there is no
hope left, terror is unnecessary."16 SIPRI's analysis is deductively in-
structive: "In view of this, the conclusion can be drawn that military
necessity in the form of coercive warfare is no argument for the thesis
that the rule forbidding attack on civilian populations as such should no
longer be considered valid." '66 In principle, use of terror as a policy in-
strument by states is rejected as unlawful by the international community
in times of war.1 6 This trend hopefully will continue through the codifi-
cation of crimes of terror in times of peace, including destruction of the
environment to instill political fear in a population.
A third school of thought postulated that Iraq's polluting action
lacked any strategic purpose per se; the oil spill was the act of a despot
probing the will of the enemy, or perhaps even that of the whole interna-
tional community. Release of the oil slick might have reflected an at-
tempt by Iraq to disrupt or strain the bounds of international norms.1 68
Expressed tersely, through its policy of intentional environmental degra-
dation, Iraq acted as a mean-spirited international bully in the Persian
Gulf.
The contention that Iraq released a massive oil spill in the gulf out
of sheer vileness is especially disturbing when viewed in light of recent
international legal developments. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
introduced the notion of ocean space beyond the limits of national juris-
diction being legally considered as the "common heritage of man-
kind. 169 Within the context of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea, the high seas are to be used for the benefit of mankind and no claims
164 Protocol I, supra note 117, art. 51, para. 2.
165 SIPRI, supra note 157, at 24.
166 Id.
167 I .
168 While the actual reasons or motivations for release of the oil slick have yet to be, and may
never be revealed, actions by the Iraqi government and its army during its occupation of Kuwait
strongly suggest that sheer meanness and perfidity might be the real considerations for the cause.
See Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Calls Gulf Oil Spill a 'Sick'Act by Hussein, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 26, 1991,
at A5. For additional testimony on the brutality of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, see AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, IRAQ/OCCUPIED KUwAIT: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS SINCE AUGUST 2,
1990, MDE 14/16/90 (Dec. 1990).
169 See Christopher C. Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage of
Mankind, 35 INT'L & CoMp. L. Q. 190, 191 (1986).
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of sovereignty or appropriation are to be recognized. 7° Such a positivist
philosophy describes open ocean space as res communis, belonging to no
state in particular and to the world community in general.1 71 Unfortu-
nately, this philosophy leaves the marine environment exposed and vul-
nerable to exploitation. As John Kindt has opined, "According to the
concept known as the 'tragedy of the commons,' property which is part
of Mankind's common heritage does not belong to anyone in particular,
and therefore, there is no individual incentive to preserve it."1' 72 Simply
put, since each state is sovereign, each government theoretically could
despoil the environment in any manner it deemed necessary. Iraq clearly
desired to seize the advantage of such a rationale.
As a sovereign state, however, Iraq still remains subject to certain
limits and rules of international law. The oil slick originated some ten
miles off the coast of occupied Kuwait-fully within the territorial sea
delimitations claimed by both Kuwait and Iraq.17 Moreover, the issue
of state responsibility must be weighed in the balance. It should be real-
ized that an international crime may result from seriously abrogating an
obligation of environmental protection law, particularly by the inten-
tional discharge of massive pollution into high seas regions.174 Such in-
ternational community environmental norms were articulated as early as
1938 in the Trail Smelter Case. 175 Though Iraq is a sovereign state, it
nonetheless is bound to abide by international law, if for no other reason
than to safeguard its own long-term interests in international affairs.1 76
The failure by the Iraqi government to fulfill its international obligations
170 1982 LOS CONVENTION, supra note 75, art. 89. As provided in part by Article 87, "The
high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked." Id. art. 87. Article 88 provides in
full that "[t]he high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes." Id. art. 88.
171 See Bradley Larschan & Bonnie C. Brennan, The Common Heritage of Mankind: Principle
in International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305 (1983). See also EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN
FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND IN-
TERGENERATIONAL EQurrY 232-247 (1989).
172 2 JOHN WARREN KINDT, MARINE POLLUTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 1105 (1986).
173 Both Kuwait and Iraq claim a twelve mile territorial sea, as also does Saudi Arabia. See J.
FENWICK & D.A. Ross, INTERNATIONAL PROFILES ON MARINE SCIENCE RESEARCH JURISDIC-
TION AND BOUNDARIES: NATURAL MARITIME CLAIMS, MSR JURISDICTION, & U.S. RESEARCH
CLEARANCE HISTORIES FOR THE WORLD'S COASTAL COUNTRIES (1992).
174 As Oscar Schachter has rightly posited, "there is no doubt that in principle, a state that
violates a rule of international law by an activity involving transborder injury is liable to make
reparation and to compensate the injured state." Schachter, supra note 1, at 482. See also Gaines,
supra note 36.
175 Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905. The tribunal decision against Canada
for its transfrontier air pollution concluded that "no State has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury.., to the territory of another or the properties or
persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence." Id. at 1965.
176 Gerhard von Glahn cites the following among the reasons why states obey international
law: "enlightened self-interest"; "necessity"; "credibility"; "habit"; "world opinion"; "social ap-
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under both the law of environmental protection and the law of armed
conflict could lead to various unilateral, regional and international ac-
tions designed to discourage similar acts in the future.1 7
Although excessive exploitation of the common heritage of mankind
might one day drift towards the "tragedy of the commons" on the high
seas, Iraq's deliberate discharge of oil occurred well within the territory
under its unlawful occupation. 17 1 While comprehensive, precisely de-
fined norms for the protection of the global environment may not cur-
rently be codified, international legal opinion remains heavily weighed
against deliberate acts of environmental destruction, especially those
which have potentially far-reaching destructive impacts on neighboring
states.1 79 That this act of degradation occurred as part of a larger unlaw-
ful act of aggression highlights its impermissible character.
Although enthusiasm for establishing an international tribunal to
try Iraqi officials for war crimes-including acts which destroyed
Kuwaiti national property-appears to be waning, i180 important prece-
dents for such trials do exist. Both the Nuremberg and Tokyo war
crimes trials after World War II focused on system criminality; that is,
the proceedings were not concerned with violations of the laws of com-
bat. Rather, the trials tended to focus more on official violations of the
laws of occupation, especially gross violations of the rights of civilian
populations.""8
Were a case to be marshalled against the Iraqi leadership in the Gulf
War, concentration should fall on violations of belligerent occupation.1 82
proval and costs"; and "disadvantages of expediency." VON GLAHN, supra note 104, at 6-7. With
respect to legal obligation, Brierly observed:
The ultimate explanation of the binding force of all law is that man, whether he is a single
individual or whether he is associated with other men in a state, is constrained, in so far as
he is a reasonable human being, to believe that order and not chaos is the governing princi-
ple of the world in which he has to live.
BRIERLY, supra note 101, at 56.
177 That is, such violations of these eco-conflict legal obligations could result in international
punitive sanctions to serve as deterrence for other would-be miscreants in the international
community.
178 The Sea Island Tanker Terminal was located ten miles offshore Kuwait. See Apple, supra
note 6 and accompanying text. Additionally, Kuwait claims a twelve mile territorial sea. See FEN-
WICK & Ross, supra note 173.
179 See generally SIPRI, ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE, supra note 2; SIPRI, WARFARE IN A
FRAGILE WORLD, supra note 151.
180 Although a U.N. Security Council Resolution would hold Iraq responsible for violations of
international law, no international tribunal has yet been established to try the war crimes nor has the
United States demonstrated enthusiasm for forcibly apprehending Saddam Hussein in order to try
him for the alleged crimes. See Hoffman, supra note 149.
181 See generally William V. O'Brien, The Nuremberg Precedent and the Gulf War, 31 VA. J.
INT'L L. 391 (1991); John Norton Moore, War Crimes and the Rule of Law in the Gulf Crisis, 31
VA. J. INT'L L. 403 (1991).
182 See Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War Crimes and Hostage-Taking,
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Such laws are well developed, internationally codified, and draw heavily
from the customary practice of states.183 Indeed, rules affecting belliger-
ent occupation are codified in Section III of the Hague Regulations re-
specting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and are entitled "On
Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State." 184 In setting
out its mandate, the Nuremberg court in fact determined that the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 had already become customary law and
were therefore binding on all states. 8 Just as the Nuremberg and To-
kyo War Crimes trials and the 1949 Geneva Conventions advanced the
laws of war towards a more humanitarian ideal, Protocol I also makes a
contribution in damage limitation. Should Protocol I be invoked in the
absence of a "military necessity defense," that instrument would hold a
commander criminally liable when actions ordered by the commander
cause extensive damage.1 86 Damage, of course, is not merely consigned
to obliteration of a military target. Excessive damage also pertains to
collateral damage of civilian areas and to destruction of the physical en-
vironment.18 7 Military doctrine has purposefully attempted to limit in
law and policy such extraordinary destruction.188
International law has substantially broadened its humanitarian em-
phasis during the past century to encompass environmental protection
during war.18 9 Interestingly enough, the Nuremberg Trials actually sup-
plied a significant source of customary law against devastation of the en-
vironment. Several defendants were tried for what amounted to the
massive devastation of the environment.1 90 Though acquitted, the will-
ingness of the tribunal to subject the accused to trial, and the finding by
the tribunal that "devastation prohibited by the Hague Rules and the
usages of war is not warranted by military necessity" 191 affirmed that the
31 VA. J. INT'L L. 351 (1991); Louis Rene Beres, The United States Should Take the Lead in Prepar-
ing International Legal Machinery for Prosecution of Iraqi Crimes, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 381 (1991).
183 See generally GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY: A
COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION (1957).
184 Annex to the Convention, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, 1 Bevans 631; ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF BEL-
LIGERENT OCCUPATION 5 (1942).
185 O'Brien, supra note 81, at 395.
186 LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 123, at 6-5.
187 Id. at 8-5.
188 Id.
189 See generally W. PAUL GORMLEY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION (1976).
190 The German policy of environmental destruction during the retreat from Norway, the So-
viet Union and the Balkans fell under the jurisdiction of the trials. See AUGUST VON KNIERIEM,
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 398-400 (1959).
191 Id. at 399.
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premeditated destruction of the environment during war is not tolerated
under the customary law of armed conflict.
In 1977, a special international agreement was negotiated that out-
lawed ecological warfare. Developed within the United Nations, the
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Technique (ENMOD) 192 asserts that parties
undertake "not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environ-
mental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe
effects as a means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State
party. 1
93
The ENMOD Convention deals with environmental changes pro-
duced by deliberate manipulation of natural processes. Though the ban
under the ENMOD Convention applies to the conduct of military opera-
tions during armed conflict, its prohibitions are intended to be distinct
from conventional warfare that might result in adverse impacts on the
environment. In short, this agreement prohibits manipulation of natural
processes (including the biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, or atmosphere
of the latter) as an instrument of war if their effects are "widespread,
long-lasting or severe."' 194 While still important, it remains regrettable
that this agreement specifies the level of damage to be prohibited. Out-
right proscription of any environmental modification for hostile purposes
would have supplied a stronger injunction against environmental
warfare.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A real nexus exists between the law of environmental protection and
the law of armed conflict that has evolved over several decades. The
192 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 16 I.L.M. 90 [hereinafter ENMOD
Convention].
193 Id. art. 1.
194 Id. Perhaps most relevant for this study, Articles 1, 2 and 4 of the ENMOD Convention
stipulate the obligatory mandate not to use environmental modification techniques in warfare:
Art. 1: Each state party to this convention undertakes not to engage in military or
any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-
lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other state.
Art. 2: As used in article 1, the term "environmental modification techniques" refers
to any technique for changing-through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes-
the dynamics, composition or structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydro-
sphere and atmosphere or of outer space.
Art. 4: Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to take any measure it con-
siders necessary in accordance with its constitutional process to prohibit and prevent any
activity in violation of the provisions of the convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or
control.
Id. arts. 1, 2 &4.
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general, over-arching principle of conservation remains the primary link
in the development in these two important bodies of contemporary inter-
national law.
The law of environmental protection is a comparably newer body of
law that only recently has emerged from under the shadow of broader
humanitarian law. Its relative novelty admittedly poses certain difficul-
ties for international law. In fact, requirements of state responsibility for
environmental protection and preservation, as well as attendant ques-
tions of liability and compensation for environmental injury currently
remain in relative flux and legal limbo. Even so, as these environmental
protection laws mature outside the war-time scenario, environmental pri-
orities must be given additional consideration by government decision-
makers and military planners. This prerequisite has become firmly fixed
in both the laws of environmental protection and armed conflict. And
the urgency for this development in international law was boldly under-
scored by the Iraqi oil spill.
Although both the law of environmental protection and that of reg-
ulation of the conduct of war share humanitarian, environmental and
conservation objectives and ideals, the law of armed conflict appears
bound to assume greater relevance in situations like the 1991 Gulf War
oil spill. That conclusion mirrors more the acceptability of environmen-
tal considerations in the laws of war than the acceptability of war in
environmental protection law. Yet, perhaps closer union of the two bod-
ies of law might strengthen the deterrent value of international law such
that tempted purveyors of environmental harm will change tactics and
resort to less destructive measures.
The notion of "ecocide" perpetrated as a crime against the environ-
ment may well become more fully recognized and legally relevant as a
result of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Governments will be more reluc-
tant to resort to wholesale policies of wanton environmental waste and
destruction, or to view such strategies as cost-effective, necessary tools of
war. Still, establishing "ecocide" as a specific crime under international
law would serve twin purposes, namely, to deter future environmental
abuse and to strengthen the moral foundations of ecological conservation
and protection. Making environmental destruction an international
crime would firmly fix Leopold's "land ethic" as a relevant construct
within the laws of war. Importantly, then, consideration of environmen-
tal preservation will have emerged as an integral component of the estab-
lished tradition of the laws of armed conflict. No less important, this
would also reaffirm the vital place held by the law of environmental pro-
tection during times of peace.
Vol. 24:29
